Introduction
Ethiopia has adopted a federal system de facto since 1991, and de jure since 1995 with a view to decentralizing power and resources from the center and to accommodate the diverse ethno-linguistic groups that exist in the country. As constitutionally entrenched division of power between federal and state governments is at the bedrock federalism and as the division of powers often is far from clear, it is inherent in any federal system that there must be an or gan for the adjudication of constitutional issues and for the settlement of dis putes concerning the competence of the two levels of governments. In the 1995 Ethiopian federal constitution, this task is entrusted to the non legislative second chamber, otherwise known as the House of Federation (HoF).
This article attempts to review the experience of the HoF ever since its estab lishment by assessing the relevant Ethiopian laws and the decisions of the HoF. With this in view the first sections are devoted, though briefly, to the discussion of the varied practices adopted in some constitutional systems. The remaining sections discuss the underlying reasons for the adoption in the 1995 federal Constitution of Ethiopia, the HoF as a unique institution for the adjudication of disputes and explore its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the judiciary and analyse its achievements and challenges.
The general trend observed is that despite institutional and pragmatic challenges, the HoF has over the years evolved as a legitimate body for the settlement of disputes at least as far as issues of high political and con stitutional significance are concerned. This article further discusses the ex tent to which the role of the judiciary has been affected owing to the role of the HoF.
Federalism and the Adjudication of Disputes: Introductory remarks and context
Ethiopia is a multicultural, multi-religious and the second most populous country (by latest estimates 77,000,000) in Africa next to Nigeria. Except for the 20 th century and leaving out some exceptions, Ethiopia existed for the most part of its long and independent history, principally under a monarchy with the Orthodox Christian faith serving as pillars of unity along with vari ous kinds of regional forces representing diversity and exercising important powers such as taxation on some economic activities, maintenance of local security and regulation of trade. Thus the seeds of what some authors call "federal society" 1 (regionally grouped diversity) has been there for long.
Towards the end of the 19 th century when Ethiopia took its present shape, and with the emergence of strong emperors, particularly Haile Selassie (1930 1974) and the Military Government (1974 -1991 , the centre virtually abol ished the autonomy of all regional forces through the introduction of central ized taxation system, modern army and police force, by sending appointees from the centre to the localities and crucial of all by imposing the motto 'one country, one culture, one language, one people, one religion.' Thus the val ues of the state and its institutions became exclusive. Furthermore, while the process brought all sorts of diverse groups, the state structure failed to incor porate them into the political process and this led to the state crisis that reigned for the most part of the 20 th century.
There is lack of consensus in explaining the source of the state crisis but two of the most dominant perspectives include the "instrumentalists" 2 most of whom include western observers and some Ethiopian analysts who portray the centralization of political power and resources as the core of the problem and consider the proliferation of ethnicity as wrong manifestation of political and economic deprivation that will simply vanish from the political spectrum with the decentralization of power and resources. On the other hand, advo cates of the "national oppression thesis" contend that Ethiopia was simply the "prison house of nationalities" and hence call not only for the decentraliza tion of power and resources but also for the accommodation of the different groups into the political process by ensuring self rule and adoption of plural istic language policy. The latter claim that identity may change or adapt in reaction to a given situation but does not necessarily vanish from the political spectrum and hence the emphasis on accommodation.
Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling party that overthrew the military regime as an advocate of the second per spective and of the right of nationalities to self-determination secession in cluded, dominated the political scene since 1991, decided to abolish the sys tem of unitary government and introduced the federal system de facto since 1991 (the Transition ranged from 1991-1994) and de jure since August 1995 with the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Since then, Ethiopia is offi cially a multicultural federation forging unity in diversity constituting nine autonomous states and two semi-autonomous cities that are accountable to the federal government.
The constituent units have been reorganized with a view to ensuring self-rule to at least some of the major nationalities and in some units this has created "inconvenient" local minorities. The attempt is to forge multicultural federa tion whose ambition is to ensure self-rule to the different nationalities, divide power and resources among the different groups and adopt an accommoda tive language policy. Consequence of which is that unlike many constitu tions, the Ethiopian Constitution commences by saying "We the nations, na tionalities and peoples of Ethiopia" and under Article 8 the nationalities are declared sovereign and under Article 39 they are granted with the right to self -determination that among others include the right to use one's language, to preserve once culture and history, the right to equitable representation at fed eral institutions and finally and if the need arises, to secede after complying with some procedures.
While some observers contend that the federal system has not in any way reduced the nature and intensity of various conflicts, a closer observation seems to reveal the point that given the political atmosphere in which we were in 1991, that is, a virtually collapsed centralized regime in which one could hardly predict what will follow shortly, the different groups have over the last decade and half shown a clear stake in the federal arrangement. Since the introduction of the federal system, there has been a significant shift of discourse from assimilation to an open accommodation of the nationalities, creating a political space to historically marginalized groups. The federal sys tem as well has diffused the various conflicts to the local level making them less a threat to the centre. Besides, the argument that conflicts are recurring and that the federation may wither away with the ruling party is something that draws its evidence from the former failed federations of the USSR and Yugoslavia. Yet, there is ample evidence indicating that such federations were "window dressing federations" 3 4 and not federations in reality. One could also make positive scenarios based on the experience from multicultural federations such as Switzerland and India. As such diversity is not a threat in itself, it becomes a fertile ground for conflict only if the system fails to provide a political solution to it in the form of resource and power sharing, the accommodation of the groups to the decision-making process and by ensuring self -rule.
Constitutional Adjudication: Conceptual Framework
Crucially important in a federation is the presence of a body that umpires disputes concerning the constitutionality of laws in general and the division of powers in particular. From the principle of constitutionally guaranteed division of power and the supremacy of the constitution follows that the last word in settling disputes about the meaning of the division of powers must not rest either with the federal government alone or with the states.
The constitutionally entrenched division of power is the hallmark of federations. However, the division of powers between the federal government and the states cannot be delineated in such a way as to avoid all conflicts. As R. Davis notes the 'division of power is artificial, imperfect and a generalized skeletal thing. Political life cannot be perfectly or permanently compartmentalized. The words can rarely be more than approximate crude and temporary guides to the ongoing or permissible political activity in any federal system.' 5 Certainly disputes about the terms of the division of power are bound to occur. Besides, adaptation and the need to adjust and accommo date the division to cope with the new, the unforeseen and the unintended remains crucial and interpretation is one of such methods. In the Ethiopian Constitution, this rather crucial function is granted to the HoF.
Time and space do not permit a comprehensive study of constitutional review of legislation in various federal systems. Yet in light of the relevance of this enterprise in consolidating the federal system, an attempt is made here to link federalism and the role of the judiciary, albeit with the main emphasis on the Ethiopian experience. Let it be clear from the outset that federalism has served as one of the important justifications for the introduction of the system of constitutional review of legislation 6 . Through the tribunal that interprets and adjudicates constitutional issues federal systems have been able to pro mote legal integration 7 . There is no exclusive claim here that federal integra tion is the sole function of the tribunal or the judiciary as indeed political and economic factors do play a crucial role in promoting integration. Yet the highest tribunals of federal systems or the body that adjudicates constitu tional issues do also play an important role. One will note that in the Pream ble of the Ethiopian Constitution an express statement is made to the effect that the federal system aims at creating 'one political and economic commu nity' and a promise of 'common destiny.' The latter, if taken seriously, has even stronger implications in the sense that if the nationalities indeed have a 'common destiny' then they have to live together. If this ambitious plan of federal integration is to have meaning then one avenue for such integration is through the mechanism of constitutional adjudication.
As already mentioned, one of the fundamental features of a federal system is the division of powers between the federal government and the states. Besides, in federal systems, not only is the federal constitution supreme but the federal law should also be declared supreme over contrary state law 8 . True that the supremacy of the federal law is not without limits. The federal legislature should enact its laws and policies within the limits set by the fed eral constitution. Once that condition is met however, federal law breaks con trary state law. Two consequences follow from this: there must be an institu tion that enforces the supremacy clauses and there must also be an institution that takes care of the daunting task of demarcating the boundary of the powers of the federal government and the states. Federal constitutions do attempt to define the scope and powers of the two levels of government but there is bound to exist natural imprecision in the language of the constitution 9 . Suffice it to mention here the wide meanings given to 6 Constitutionalism, the incorporation of hu man rights in many national constitutions and rule of law are the other justifications. The former upholds that governmental power is limited by constitutional norms. 'interstate commerce,' 'implied powers' and the 'necessary and proper' clause by the United States Supreme Court. Through the mechanism of constitutional adjudication then federal integration is given a more concrete meaning.
2.1-Differences between Institutions: USA and Germany
For historical and philosophical reasons, constitutions have adopted different mechanisms for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and decisions of government bodies. The (dis)trust that the states may have over the judiciary, the differing commitments to natural law or legal positivism and the differ ing application of the notion of separation of powers have influenced, in one way or another, the nature and scope of the national institution established to review issues of constitutionality 10 . Pre-WWII Europe trusted its legislature and led to the horrors and that in turn led to a shift in paradigm, for instance, in Germany to the evolution of Constitutional Court.
Broadly speaking, one can see two patterns regarding the institutions empowered to adjudicate constitutional issues. Many federal systems have vested this important power either in their ordinary courts or separate constitutional courts. Accordingly, these courts not only have the power to interpret the constitution, but are also and even more importantly entitled to decide on the conformity of the laws with the constitution. What is common in all is the fact that there is commitment to a 'higher law,' that reflects the society's fundamental values and a law that contravenes this higher law should cease to exist by some kind of procedure 11 . The systems do not accept the 'omnipotence' of positive law, but rather subject positive law to a supe rior law, according to modern notions, the latter being constitutional law. Yet although constitutional review through the courts is in principle based on the principle of subjecting legislation to a higher law, it essentially has two distinct forms.
On the one hand, there is this diffused (decentralized) system also called the American-system that accords every branch of the judiciary the right to re view the constitutionality of laws. In principle any court has the power to de clare any law or decision of an executive body unconstitutional, if such a law or decision violates the constitution, final appeal being reserved to the federal Supreme Court. This has been the case since the famous decision of Chief Justice John Marshal of the US in Marbury v. Madison 12 in 1803. Since then many other countries including India have adopted it. Some traces of it also exist in Switzerland where the courts have the power to disregard cantonal laws. In Switzerland, judicial control is not, however, allowed over federal laws.
What characterizes the decentralized system of judicial review in the US is the requirement of the presence of 'real controversy and adverse parties' 13 for the Court to decide the constitutional question. Besides the US Supreme Court would insist that the matter must be justiciable and must not involve 'political questions.' 14 The ordinary courts decide constitutional issues in the process of disposing their routine function and review of constitutionality is, therefore, something that comes to the courts incidental to the case 15 . The logic of the decentralized system in a nutshell is that it is the duty of the judges to apply and interpret the law and in so doing if the judges find con tradiction and inconsistency between two laws of different hierarchies, it is the duty of the judges to apply the higher law 16 .
On the other hand, the centralized system confers the power of reviewing the A Constitution is, in fact, and must be re garded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain it's meaning, as well as the meaning of any par ticular Act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irrec oncilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and valid ity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.' constitutionality of laws to constitutional courts 17 . Typical of which is the German Constitutional Court characterized by its distinctive constitutional jurisdiction. It constitutes two senates each with eight judges: one handling mainly basic human rights cases, otherwise known as constitutional com plaints while the other senate decides disputes involving constitutional issues proper. Half of the judges are selected for a single non-renewable term of twelve years, by a special electoral committee of the Bundestag while the other half are selected by the Bundesrat and to that extent by the govern ments of the states. In both cases a majority of two-thirds is required which is impossible to arrive at unless there is a consensus among the major parties. Thus the federal government and the states have influence on the selection of the judges of the Court.
The manner of appointment as well as some of its powers, according to some authorities, give the Constitutional Court a hybrid role: political and legal 18 . Distinct from and independent of the ordinary courts, the Constitutional Court serves as a watchdog for the enforcement of the supremacy of the constitution. The Court as such does not involve itself in the ordinary settle ment of disputes unless the case relates to a constitutional question. How ever, it does not restrict itself to constitutional issues emanating from specific cases. It can also decide differences of opinion or doubts on the compatibility of federal or state law with the Basic Law upon the request of a few public bodies 19 .
Compared to the American Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Court has an extensive and wide-ranging jurisdiction regarding the Basic Law. 
2.2-The House of Federation: The Ethiopian Choice
The practice of constitutional interpretation in Ethiopia follows a different pattern. According to the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution, the authority to inter pret the Constitution is vested in the second chamber, the House of Federa tion. Articles 62 and 83 of the Constitution not only empower the HoF to decide constitutional disputes, but also to interpret the constitution 22 .
Unlike second chambers in other federations, the HoF has no law-making function 23 . The rationale for vesting the power of interpreting the Constitu tion in the HoF, and not in the regular judiciary or a constitutional court, as can be gathered from the minutes of the Constitutional Assembly, emanate from two sources. One is related to the view of the framers regarding the 'nature' of the Constitution in general and to the role of the nationalities in particular. The framers think that the new federal dispensation is the outcome of the 'coming together' of the nationalities. Indeed, it is clearly stipulated in the preamble and Article 8 of the Constitution that the 'nations, nationalities and peoples are sovereign.' The Constitution is considered as the reflection of the 'free will and consent' of the nationalities. It is, in the words of the framers, 'a political contract' and therefore only the authors that are the na tionalities should be the ones to be vested with the power of interpreting the Constitution 24 . To this effect, the HoF that is composed of the representatives of the various nationalities is expressly granted the power to review the con stitutionality of laws and of course other essential powers as well. 25 22 There has been some confusion in the ter minologies between what constitutes consti tutional disputes and constitutional interpre tation, although they are of less practical significance because both powers belong to the HoF. Under Article 62(1), the HoF has the power to interpret the Constitution. Arti cle 84 (1) The second reason is related to the first. The framers were well aware of the fact that empowering the judiciary or a constitutional court may result in unnecessary 'judicial adventurism' or what some prefer to call 'judicial activism' in which the judges would in the process of interpreting vague clauses of the Constitution put their own preferences and policy choices in the first place. Thus the framers argued, this might result in hijacking the very document that contains the 'compact between the nationalities' to fit the judges' own personal philosophies. It is not difficult to understand the fears and concerns of the framers in light of the fact that the judiciary in Ethiopia
has not yet won 'the hearts and minds' of the ordinary citizen.
As will be noted below, the good days in which the judiciary gains prestige and respect as the third branch of the government, are yet to come. Yet one could argue in favour and against the policy choices made in the Ethiopian Constitution. Elsewhere it is argued that owing to the lack of theoretically sound basis for the institutions that interpret the constitution in many juris dictions and taking into account the fact that in many countries including Ethiopia the prestige of the judiciary is low and that establishing deep rooted institutions for democracy to operate may take time, any constitution that claims to incorporate both constitutionalism and democracy, two of the com peting values, must attempt to reflect both values in the process of constitu tional adjudication. The application of the two values to constitutional inter pretation will result in establishing a tribunal composed of legal professionals and politicians, (similar to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry-CCI) a tri bunal capable of rendering binding decisions on cases brought before it. A tribunal so composed will be in a theoretically sound and politically legiti mate position. Such tribunal best suits the nature of the enterprise called con stitutional interpretation 26 .
25 (cont.) Each nationality has at least one member but each nationality is represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population. I have earlier on argued as a result that the HoF is majoritarian in much the same way as the other house and the claim that it is guardian of the nationalities is rather fluid at best and pre tentious at worst. At state level two patterns are evolving. In the regional states of Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia, the state consti tutions established a 'Constitutional Interpre -tation Commission' composed of represen tatives from each district/wereda Council. In Tigray, the members of the HoF are also members of the Commission and in Amhara every nationality is also represented. In SNNPRS, however, the Constitution estab lished a 'Council of Nationalities,' a house more or less identical with the federal HoF both in terms of power and composition. Behind the policy choice of the members of the Constitutional Assembly to vest the power to interpret the Constitution and to review the constitutionality of laws in the HoF, not the judiciary, has something to do with the reputation of the judiciary and ideological matters. In Ethiopia's legacy of adjudication , cases formed part and parcel of public administration. One finds a merger of functions within the executive, the administration of justice and the executive function proper. Indeed, adjudication of cases was considered to be the prin cipal function of the executive. For example, during Menlik's 1908 appoint ment of the ministers, the Minster of Justice was also the Chief Justice 26 27 .
The attempt to separate the judiciary from the executive was not that easy either. A long and tiring process of negotiation in 1942 led to a partial victory as far as the judiciary is concerned: only the highest benches, that is, the High Court and the Supreme Imperial Court were able to be relatively free from the influence of provincial administrators. In all other respects, the court structure until 1992, reflected the traditional practice of combining judicial and executive functions in the person of the local chiefs and provincial gov ernors. At the apex of the court structure one found until 1974, the Emperor, dispensing justice in the Zufan Chilot (Crown Court) 28 . 26 (cont.) The judiciary is often criticized for being anti-majoritarian, at odds with the democratic principle; judicial activism is also considered at odds with the principle of separation of powers for it takes away the role of the other branches of governments and many consider the judiciary lacks the competence to make law. But such opinions at times go too far in the sense that judicial functions have procedural and substantive limits. Judicial discretion is not as open asmany think it to be. Besides modern con stitutions stipulate many mechanisms of preventing tyranny and do not as such pro vide pure democracy. Thus we speak of horizontal and vertical separation of powers, federalism, supremacy of the constitution, checks and balances, human rights and so on. Apart from this the legitimacy of the court and legitimacy of the other political branches come from different sources. For the judiciary, it is its impartiality and its procedural fairness that it provides to the parties that serves its legitimate existence. For the other branches, it is democratic accountability to the electorate. More impor tantly, even in the area of constitu-tional review, the courts may have the last say, but it is only for a time. The Court may modify or even reverse its former decision. More importantly, the legislature may modify or even reverse the decision of the court, and constitutional amendment as well can re verse the decision of a court. This blend of judicial and executive functions in the latter is not without im plications. As briefly noted in the introduction, the crisis of the state had its effect on the judiciary as well. Indeed, it is difficult to see the judiciary in isolation from the whole political system under which it operates. First and foremost the judiciary never had a separate existence of its own as an institu tion. It was subject to all kinds of pressures from the other branches. Thus, external pressure on the judiciary has deep roots and is not without some hangovers on the new federal judiciary. Administrators at state level, even today, think that it is natural to order the judge or at times even close benches at the lower level of administration 29 . Second, the judiciary never survived the regime it established. It was no surprise to see every new regime setting up its own version of the judiciary that suits its mission. It was never de signed to be an institution as the third branch of the government in the real sense. This has left an impression on ordinary citizens to the effect that changes in government will entail another round of appointments and dis missals of judges. Thus in 1991 when EPRDF came to power and introduced the new federal system, the prestige and reputation of the judiciary was at its ebb, particularly in association with a despotic regime, well-known for exe cution of life without any semblance of due process of law 30 .
The judicial system in Ethiopia is under serious pressure both from what Cappelletti calls 'the consumers of law and justice,' 31 that is the citizens and the government of the society under which it operates. There is a serious complaint that the judiciary is dragging its feet in rendering decisions both at state and federal levels and as a result its role in enforcing contracts and creating an atmosphere of stability and predictability for business thereby promoting economic development, is questioned. The judiciary, on the other hand, complains about a whole list of factors affecting its performance: salary, lack of trained judges, resources and absence of economic security, political pressure and commitment of its own judges. Added to this is the ideological challenge of the ruling party. Until recently its commitment to the judiciary, despite the constitutional provisions was far from clear. The judiciary was a suspect. It was associated with pre-democratic regimes or is 29 The framers of the Constitution, however, recognized the fact that interpretation involves legal technicalities. As a result, the HoF is assisted by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCT), consisting of eleven members that among others comprise the Chief Justice and his deputy of the Federal Supreme Court, who also serve respectively as chairman and vice chairman of the CCT. Six other legal experts are appointed by the President of the Re public with the recommendation of the lower house, as a matter of practice coming from different constituent states, and three persons are designated by the HoF from among its members.
The CCT has the power to investigate constitutional disputes. The investiga tion may result in a prima facie case calling for interpreting the Constitution, in which case the CCT is required to 'submit its recommendations' to the HoF or remand the case and render a 'decision' if it finds there is no need for con stitutional interpretation. Tn the latter case, the party dissatisfied with the de cision of the CCT may appeal to the HoF 34 . Thus it is clear that the CCT is merely an advisory body to the HoF, lacking the competence to give a bind ing decision. The HoF as well has been at liberty to disregard the CCT's opin ions in some cases 35 .
The Jurisdiction and Procedures of the HoF
Although the Constitution has been less clear on the scope of powers of the HoF and the procedures to be employed in the process of adjudicating 35 The practice so far indicates that the HoF has for the most part endorsed the decisions of the CCI but in the case of the Benishangul-Gumuz case (discussed in infra) it disre garded the opinion of the majority and the minority and came up with an entirely new decision. It also appears that the CCI's opin ion in many cases is not well-articulated and often is very brief. This is perhaps because the members are quite busy with other func tions and have little time to do research con cerning the cases.
constitutional issues, the 'law consolidating the HoF and defining its powers and responsibilities' has attempted to clarify some of the ambiguities 36 . The issues under discussion require some remarks on this new 'law.'
3.1-The Respective Role of the HoF and the Courts within the Constitu tional Framework
When one thinks of a law (enacted by the House of Peoples' Representatives -HoPR) that defines the 'powers and responsibilities' of the HoF itself estab lished by the Constitution to check the constitutionality of the laws of the HoPR, the first question that comes to mind is whether the law itself is con stitutional or not. Could the HoPR really define the powers and responsibili ties of the HoF? More specifically, does the HoPR have competence to do so? Would not such power, if it existed at all, lead to a conclusion that the HoPR may in the process limit, extend or even take away the competence of the HoF? Is not the HoF competent enough to define its responsibilities in light of the broad powers indicated in the Constitution? These are interesting questions which might someday be dealt with by the HoF. In the early phase of the process of drafting such law, some experts, aired their concerns in a small gathering organized by the HoF and HoPR and stated that in light of the function of reviewing constitutionality of laws, the attempt to define the powers of the HoF through the HoPR is questionable. However, their opinion did not seem to have won the support of the actors.
More important, however, is the issue pertaining to the compatibility of the two new laws with the Constitution. 37 The new laws deal with the HoF and the CCI regarding the jurisdiction of the HoF and indirectly 'strips the juris diction' of the regular judiciary, a judiciary which has already been weak ened because it lacks the competence to review the constitutionality of laws.
In an earlier study and before the enactment of the laws, this author has tried to define the respective roles of the Courts and the HoF 38 . In light of the gen erality of the clauses of the Constitution on the respective role of these bod ies, the author's main finding was to restrict the role of the HoF in reviewing the constitutionality of laws enacted by the legislature: federal and state; There is a second reason that leads to the same conclusion. In parliamentary systems (including Ethiopia), the supremacy of parliament, subject of course to the supremacy of the Constitution, requires that all other branches of gov ernment are bound to assume that legislation enacted by parliament is consti tutional and the courts are prohibited from nullifying such legislation. The presumption of constitutionality has expressly been incorporated in the new law 40 * * . Thus, administrative acts and decisions of public bodies could be ques tioned for their constitutionality as well as for their conformity with the en actment of parliament by the regular judiciary. And the third reason pertains to the practice of the CCI as well hinted at this position, at least until the en actment of the laws. However, the constitutional position as well as practice have been confused with the enactment of the new laws. According to the new laws, 'law' (that is subject to the investigation for its constitutionality by the HoF) shall mean proclamations issued by the federal or state legislative organs and regulations and directives issued by the federal and states government institutions and it shall also include international agreements that have been ratified by Ethiopia.' 43 44 Thus by defining 'the law' too broadly to include all conceivable acts of the legislature and the executive, the drafters of the new laws that are supposed to define the role of the HoF and the CCI, have themselves apparently come up with an unconstitutional law. This is so because the Federal Constitution is at least clear on this point: it never intended to include regulations, directives and decisions of administrative bodies in the way the laws attempted to include. By so doing the drafters have wiped out or at least attempted to wipe out the jurisdiction of the courts: federal and state. The issue as to how this anomaly is to be settled by the HoF thus remains to be 44 seen .
But at least the case brought before the CCI by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) 45 
3.2-Horizontal separation of powers: A comparative overview
On the issues of horizontal separation of powers and umpiring the federal system, the main argument justifying the power of the HoF emanated from the nature of the HoF as well as from the experience that one draws from the Supreme Court of the United States and the German Constitutional Court. The latter is empowered to adjudicate disputes among the highest federal in stitutions: the federal president, the two federal chambers and the federal government in respect of their constitutional powers. Through the procedure of abstract review as well, it reviews the compatibility of legislation with the constitution. In doing so and despite express constitutionally based power, it has been at times criticized 'for making political choices between competing legislative programs for which it is neither competent nor equipped.' 46
The American Supreme Court does not have as extensive power as the German Constitutional Court to adjudicate abstract review or differences of opinion among federal branches. The Supreme Court adjudicates concrete disputes arising from cases and controversies between parties. 
'republican form of the government,' 'the conduct of foreign affairs,' issues related to war, impeachment, 'presidential powers discretion,' and recogni tion of foreign governments.
For these kinds of issues, it is argued, the political branches rather than the Supreme Court are relatively more legitimate to address the resolution of dis putes among the branches of the federal government. The exact contours of the political question doctrine is less precise though. It appears that the doc trine has some relevance when it concerns the exercise of powers within the confines of the (horizontal) separation of powers. It becomes relevant when the question is whether one of the institutions is alleged to have encroached upon the powers of the other branches. There and then the Court does not seem to hesitate to adjudicate the matter. But the doctrine becomes less rele vant, for instance, if the issue is as to whether the executive made the correct use of its executive powers because discretion is often left to the same insti tution and the judiciary cannot replace the executive. While this has been the general trend, some, like Jesse Choper, went even further in stating that:
The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President vis-a-vis one another; rather the ultimate constitutional issue of whether executive action (or inac tion) violates the prerogatives of Congress or whether legislative action (or inaction) transgresses the realm of the President should be held to be non justiciable, their final resolution to be remitted to the interplay of national political process 48 49 .
At any rate, issues concerning the horizontal separation of powers often fall within the grey areas of law and politics and the settlement of such disputes truly involves political matter, which the regular judiciary may lack the com petence to deal with. However, the HoF would be the most suitable candi date as it is more a political than a judicial body. It is in recognition of this fact that it is stated: 'A case requiring constitutional interpretation which may not be handled by courts may be submitted to the CCI by, at least, one executive bodies.' 50 No specific case has yet been reported under this proce dure but it may be interpreted to cover two crucial aspects: horizontal separa tion of powers both at federal and state levels as well as vertical division of powers between the federal and state governments. This appears to be so from the nature of the parties.
3.3-Respective powers at federal and state levels
The same could be said about the task of defining the respective powers of the federal government and the states, an essential aspect of federal systems. (1997) . 55 US v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995 . 56 US v. Morrison 529 US 598, 608, (2000) . 57 This refers to the FCC competence to de cide disputes as to the rights and duties of the federation and the states. It is basically a question of defining the respective jurisdic tion of the concerned organs.
review 58 , have at times been criticized for encouraging litigation by actors in the federal system, to frustrate political projects of their opponents at another level. Losers in the political process often resort to the Court to reverse a political decision. It is important to note that most of the federal powers in Germany belong to concurrent and framework powers. The federal government extensively used these powers and the FCC on its part insisted that whatever conditions stated in the Basic Law for the exercise of concurrent and framework powers is a matter for the discretion of the federal legislature. It subscribed to the political question doctrine and in the end the states lost much of their powers. In 1994 the Basic Law was amended, which has a bearing on the exercise of not only framework and concurrent powers but also on the jurisdiction of the FCC. An attempt is made to narrow down the discretion of the federal legislature in the exercise of concurrent and framework powers 59 . By doing so the Basic Law tries to extend the legislative autonomy of the states.
The failure by the FCC to exercise its power under the old provisions of the Basic Law to regulate the discretion of the federal legislature in the areas of framework and concurrent powers also prompted an amendment on the jurisdiction of the FCC. Accordingly, the Basic Law stipulates that the FCC has jurisdiction 'in the event of disagreements whether a law meets the re quirements of paragraph (2) of Article 72 [this paragraph sets the conditions that should be complied with for the federal government in order to enact concurrent law], on application of the Bundesrat or of the government or leg islature of the Land.' 60 Thus in Germany, unlike the United States, the juris diction of the FCC is express even in areas, which the United States Supreme Court would consider to be political. The new amendment is clear enough in this respect. It is an attempt to reverse the FCC's earlier position at least in the areas of concurrent powers.
3.4-Federal issues in the Ethiopian Context
In the Ethiopian situation, it does not seem there is a need to consider the fed eral issues at two levels in the way the literature about the American system 58 Refers to the determination of whether a norm of federal or state law is in conformity with the Basic Law or whether a state law conforms to federal law. It can be initiated by federal or state government, one-third of the members of the Bundestag without refer ence to any concrete case. This procedure is unique in the sense that it has no parallel, for instance, in the United States. In the United States safeguarding the constitution is only possible as long as there is a case. See Basic Law Article 93. 59 See Artiles 72 (2) and 75 (2) of the Basic Law. 60 Basic Law Article 93 (1) 2a. It is remark able that the Land legislature has the right to bring this action before the FCC. They are the ones who lost much of their power because of exces-sive exercise of federal concurrent power.
provides. Nor is there any ground to trust the political process to safeguard federalism. Indeed the federal system in Ethiopia is unique, as the states have no role in the law-making process at federal level. When the Americans sug gest that the political processes can provide a better alternative, it is because the federal government and the states are actively involved in the federal leg islative process. The Senate is expected to check the lower house and safe guard the interests of the states. No such comparable guarantee exists in Ethiopia. The only guarantee for the nationalities appears to be the vigilant exercise of their powers as ultimate interpreters of the constitution. Yet, the same House, although considered by many as the House of nationalities, is a house dominated by the nationalities with the highest population count. Thus it is composed in a more or less similar fashion like the lower house. At any rate federalism in its broad sense, that is, defining the respective powers of the federal government and the states as well as checking the compatibility of federal and state laws with the constitution, is one area of jurisdiction for the HoF 61 . The issue of the political question doctrine becomes less relevant in this respect because from the outset the HoF is a political body. The debate on 'judicial activism' versus 'judicial self-restraint' is thus less relevant in the Ethiopian context. As the following cases illustrate, the HoF as a quasijudicial/political body seems to be legitimate organ for cases that are of high political and constitutional significance.
The first controversial case concerns the Silte decision 62 a case in which a certain community that were perceived to be part of the Guraghe ethnic group wanted to secede from the latter and set up a local government in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS-one of the nine constituent units of the federation-inhabited by more than 56 small ethnic groups). The process involved, as required by the federal Constitution Arts 39 and 47, the local population, the regional parliament (constituted of the diverse groups) and the HoF but the respective role of these actors was never clear. The matter was finally resolved in 2000 by a referendum organized by the HoF in which large majority of the Silte's chose to secede and form a local government within the constituent unit. Given the complexity of the case (who is the 'self' that determines the right to self-rule at local level?) and the number of institutions involved (the two ethnic groups at local level, the state parliament composed of the various ethnic groups and the HoF), the final decision of the HoF to submit the matter to a referendum, though the issue of who should participate in the referendum is far from settled, and the fact that the final verdict was gracefully accepted by all concerned indicates the wise approach adopted by the HoF.
A second and more controversial one is the Benishangul-Gumuz case that involved the tension in the region between the indigenous groups (Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo and Mao) and the highlanders (Amhara, Oromo and Tigray nationalities). Candidates from Amhara, Oromo and Tigray nationalities for the 2000 election for the regional council were prohibited on the basis that they were not able to speak any one of the five languages namely Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo and Mao. Particularly the Berta in sisted that the candidates should not be allowed to run for office if none of them are versed in Berta language. It accordingly petitioned the Election Board and the latter decided to bar them from running as candidates stating that they were not able to speak the Berta language. The Amharas, Oromos and Tigray ans, most of them transferred to the region during the Derg's (military regime that ruled the country from 1974-1991) resettlement pro gram (constituting some forty seven per cent of the population in the region), complained to the HoF against the decision of the Electoral Board on Yekatit 10, 1992 E.C. (February 2000) . The applicants argued that the decision of the Board violated their constitutional right to be elected granted to every citizen without any discrimination and asked the House to quash it as it contravenes the supremacy clause of the federal constitution (Article 9).
The CCI gave its opinion on Sene 29, 1992 (6 July 2000) to the HoF admitting that the application raises constitutional interpretation questions. The expert opinion constitutes majority and a dissenting one. The issues formulated were: as to whether the law 63 which sets the conditions for candidature, one of which is knowledge of the vernacular of the state, is in violation of the constitution or not? And as to whether the decision of the Electoral Board based on such law is constitutional or not 64 .
The majority, after considering the relevant law and the Constitution 65 rather 63 The law in question is the Proclamation to make the briefly opined that because the proclamation stated knowledge of the local language as a condition for candidacy, it violated the constitutional provision on the right to take part in conducting public offices as well as to be elected. Tt stated that the proclamation discriminates against those who are not versed in one of the local vernaculars and concluded the proclamation violated the Constitution. On the Board's decision it stated that it is based on this uncon stitutional provision and because the law is referred to the HoF the viability of the decision hinges on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the proclamation referred to the HoF.
The minority view is more elaborate and is mainly based on the constitu tional argument that the issue has to be seen in light of the letter and spirit of the whole constitutional text rather than on a single provision and it needs balancing between two or more competing constitutional values. The minor ity acknowledged that there is an express clause on the right to elect and to be elected as well as the fact that the Constitution does not allow discrimina tion on the basis of language. However, it articulated that in this case there is no discrimination on the basis of language and considered the decision of the Board, not in violation of the Constitution.
Tt stated that the proclamation does not discriminate on the basis of language.
In much the same way as in the Oromia, Amhara or Tigray regional states, that is constituent states in which the regional working language is the lan guage of one of the dominant nationalities, anyone who is not versed in the regional government's working language cannot run for office as a candidate. By the same analogy, anyone who does not speak any of the local vernacular languages in Benishangul-Gumuz, whatever his or her nationality may be, cannot run for office and the minority insisted that this cannot be considered a violation of the Constitution on grounds of discrimination. The minority focused on the peculiarity of the Ethiopian federal system and its emphasis on the sovereignty of nationalities and the fact that language constitutes one essential attribute of identity.
The HoF considered both opinions but rendered a different decision which was more in line with the opinion of the minority than with that of the majority 66 . It emphasized that no doubt if the candidate is to speak for the 66 See decision of the HoF of Megabit 5, 1995 E.C (12 March 2003 that in a nutshell upheld the law as constitutional but declared the decision of the Board as unconstitutional and hence of no effect with prospective effect. It articulated that Article 38 of the proclamation is not in violation of Article 38 of the Constitution. It also underscored that whoever wants to run as a candidate is required to know the working language of the regional state, and not one of the local vernaculars (unpublished).
people he/she claims to represent in parliament or to introduce his/her aims and programs to the electorate, he/she is required to know the regional official language. By virtue of the proclamation, the candidate is required to know the official language of the region and to that extent the proclamation does not contradict the principles of the Constitution. On the other hand, the House found the Board's interpretation of the proclamation to mean a candidate should be versed in any of the indigenous languages, particularly the Berta language, one of the five languages spoken in the region that is not the official language of the regional state, unconstitutional and declared it null with prospective effect. Of interest in this regard is the fact that because of the multi-ethnic nature of the regional state and because Amharic is widely spoken by a large majority of the people in the region, the regional Council has adopted Amharic as the official language.
Comments on HoF Decisions
It is easier to start with the expert opinion of the CCI majority. They empha sized the constitutional provision of the right of the citizen to elect and to be elected and the principle of non-discrimination stipulated in the same text. According to the majority it does not matter whether the candidate who is elected in the regional council speaks or understands the local vernacular. The candidate has the right to be elected and cannot be prohibited because he/she does not speak the language. This misses the fundamental virtue of not only the Ethiopian Constitution, which is apparently based on the free will of nationalities, but also the values of federalism, unity in diversity. The nationalities are declared sovereign under the Ethiopian constitution and con stituent states are established to empower at least some of the major nation alities to have their own 'mother' states, the right to administer themselves, to use their own language and even to secede. In multicultural federations in as much as we need to have a politically and economically integrated society, we also have to respect and promote diversity. The crucial issue is to draw the balance between the two.
The minority opinion, even though it emphasized the importance of investigating the whole text and the fact that the nationalities are considered as the building bricks of the federation, was not specific enough as in the decision of the HoF to emphasize the point that what is required under the proclamation is the candidate's knowledge of the working language of the regional state, and not of any of the local vernaculars. But in doing so the minority have touched upon one of the thorny issues in the federal system to which neither the majority nor the HoF was able to provide an answer. Could one really argue with a lot of emphasis that a candidate cannot run for office as long as she/he cannot understand even one of the local languages? Would it be possible to give an affirmative answer to this question under the constitution or should these multi-ethnic regions be subject to a different treatment: they do not have their own regional governments and because many ethnic groups are living there they had to adopt Amaharic for communication and because of this highlanders are not required to know any of the local vernaculars. This raises the central issue of the dilemma in the federal system 67 on the one hand declaring the equality of states and nation alities whereas on the other hand only some nationalities have their own con stituent states. Those who do not have their own constituent states cannot impose the language requirement on the candidate as is the case in other re gional states, for example Amhara, Somali, Oromia and Tigray. This is a question that opens Pandora's box. unlike many other federal constitutions. It appears that the nationalities are considered as building bricks as if they preceded the federation. All this taken together seems to indicate that at the time of the federal bargain the forces of diversity prevailed over the forces of unity whereas in many work ing federations one finds a balance in which forces of unity slightly prevail over the forces of diversity. If this argument is pushed further then it may imply that the Constitution has taken a position as far as the tension between collective versus individual rights is concerned, in favor of the former. If so, the decision of the Electoral Board, however absurd it may be in creating 'small islands' everywhere, forcing every citizen to find out where his 'mother state' is, could be justified. This is, however, contrary to the political and economic integration envis aged by the federal Constitution. In the Preamble it is stated 'We, the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia: strongly committed, to building a po litical community founded on the rule of law.... Convinced that to live as one economic community is necessary in order to create sustainable and mutually supportive conditions...have, therefore, adopted this Constitution through representatives we have duly elected for this purpose as an instrument that binds us in mutual commitment to fulfil the objectives and the principles set forth above.' Thus, it is a clear political and economic integration that the federation envisages. It is good to note the emphasis given to the free movement of labour and capital across the country as a means to enhance this project in a recent federal document 70 . Seen from this angle, the position of the minority is an extreme.
Another argument against the minority could be deduced from the Constitu tion. The Constitution has for one reason or another made a choice (Article 46). By outlining only nine member states it seems to have defined what con stitutes majority and minority nationalities. One can then conclude that the language test under Article 38 of the proclamation is only applicable to those states defined under Articles 46 and 47 and not to other states. Lastly, the position of the minority in the CCI's decision not only enhances majorityminority tension but goes even further and creates minority tyranny over majority in some of the constituent states. The CCI minority by adopting such a position closes its eyes to the rights of economic migrants. Yet, the decision of the HoF skilfully escapes this thorny issue by focusing on the technical interpretation of the provisions of the proclamation without substantively addressing the concerns of the indigenous ethnic groups. 70 See Be Ethiopia Ye Democrasiyawi Sirat Ginbata Gudayoch, Ginbot 1994 E.C. (Addis Ababa, Ministry of Information) 169, 180, 207, 214. Despite the above mentioned limitations, the decision on this case is perhaps one of the most celebrated decisions of the HoF that attempted to strike a bal ance between the concerns of the different groups.
In addition to the cases so far discussed, the HoF has resolved the border dis pute between Oromia and the Somali regional state 71 . A controversy that en sued following the restructuring of the regional states in line with the 1995 Constitution with a view to ensuring self rule to the nationalities. There arose a boundary dispute between the two regions covering long disputed boundary and that was finally resolved by a referendum organized by the HoF. Because of its sensitivity and magnitude, the HoF entered into extensive dialogue with the communities involved, the two regional governments and finally reached at an amicable settlement.
Indeed, given the comparative experience -the Supreme Court of the US imposing self restraint on itself based on the 'political question' doctrine and the German FCC hesitating to enforce matters that it felt belongs to the political branches, the HoF's bold assertion in the three cases (i.e. Selti refer endum, Beneshngul Gumuz case and the Oromia-Somali border issue) indi cate the point that the HoF is an appropriate body for issues in the grey area between law and politics. Yet the HoF's jurisdiction needs to be confined to cases that have a high political and constitutional significance. These are matters with significant political flavour for which the judiciary may be ill suited to handle with care.
Concrete Review and Individual Complaints
Two other areas of jurisdiction for the HoF include the concrete review and individual complaints. There is an interesting similarity in this respect between the FCC and the HoF. 72 In case of concrete review, the regular judi- 71 The two regional states share more than 1000 km border area. In the border areas inhabited by nomadic people, the tension between communities over grazing land and water predates the present federal set up. ciary, if it comes across a case the disposition of which requires the interpre tation of the constitution or the checking of the compatibility of the law at issue with the constitution, must refer the constitutionality issue to the FCC or the HoF, because reviewing the constitutionality of laws is the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court or the HoF. The court adjudicating the merits of the case does not have the jurisdiction to investigate the constitutionality is sue. The reference to the FCC or the HoF could be made by the court on its own initiative or on the application of parties. There is thus a split of function between the regular court that decides on the merits of the case and the FCC or the HoF that decides the conformity of the legislation with the constitution without going into the merits of the case. This is different from the American courts in which in principle any court decides the constitutionality of the law in the process of deciding the merit of the case. The monopoly power of the FCC or the HoF in many parliamentary federations is justified by the respect for the legislature. Not every court should be allowed to disregard the will of parliament 73 .
An interesting issue in this respect concerns the question when the court is bound to refer the matter to the HoF or the FCC. Is it enough for the court to refer the constitutionality issue so long as an objection to this effect is raised by one of the parties or should the court wait until there is some doubt on the law's constitutionality or should the court convince itself beyond doubt that the law is unconstitutional? This is crucial because if the court has to establish for itself that there is a prima facie case of unconstitutionality, before referring the matter, then the court is in a way reviewing, albeit not conclusively, the constitutionality of the law. It is only that it cannot repeal or declare the law unconstitutional. Apart from this, if mere objection by a party leads to a reference of the case to the FCC or the HoF then the jurisdiction of the court could practically be hampered for trivial reasons. It is in recognition of this fact that the law stipulates: 'The Court handling the case shall submit it to the CCI only if it believes that there is a need for constitutional interpretation in deciding the case. violated by the final decision of any government institution or official may present his case to the CCI for constitutional interpretation.' 76 This is significant in the sense that the constitution was silent on constitutional complaints. In Germany this procedure has both subjective and objective purposes. It was introduced to serve as a form of legal protection to the individual once certain procedures for its exercise are complied with. It is an extraordinary remedy available to the individual for protecting the individual's basic rights and in that sense it is there to render a legal remedy to an individual against any law, directive or final decision of any branch of the government, including the judiciary. On the other hand, it also has an objective function. The decision might clarify a general constitutional issue or might preserve the legal system in general. In the latter case even if the complaint is withdrawn, the FCC may continue to render its decisions because it is of general interest to the legal system 77 .
The relevance of the complaint procedure is not yet an established practice in Ethiopia. Nor is the distinction between objective and subjective purposes of the complaint well understood. In one case 78 (before the issuance of the new law), the CCI rendered a decision that gave the impression that this proce dure has only a subjective purpose. The real parties in dispute were husband and wife involved in a divorce case. A Sharia Court had already rendered a decision, but the wife who was not happy with the outcome of the case took the matter to the Federal First Instance Court, requesting for the reversal of the decision of the Sharia Court. The husband, on the other hand, applied to the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council requesting this body to intervene on behalf of the Muslim community in general in finding out whether the regu lar judiciary has the competence to review decisions of religious courts.
The alleged unconstitutionality was related to the fact that the Sharia Court has already rendered a binding decision to the parties. The Supreme Council lodged a petition to the CCI on the matter. The issue before the CCI was whether (or not) ordinary courts (at whatever level) have the constitutional mandate to review the decisions of the Sharia Courts pursuant to Articles 34 (5) 79 case on the ground that only the parties to the dispute, not the Supreme Council, have the standing to refer the matter to the CCI.
Yet, the CCI's position is subject to criticism. Although the decision of the CCI or the HoF in the end would have an implication for the parties in dis pute, the case mainly sought an abstract or general remedy from the CCI. The Supreme Council was as representative of the Muslim community seeking to define the scope of legal pluralism tolerated by the Constitution. It was an attempt as such to define the role of religious and traditional institutions within the general constitutional framework.
It is important to mention that the procedure of constitutional complaint both in Germany and Ethiopia is subject to rigorous scrutiny before the FCC or the HoF admits the application. In Germany, because the number of constitutional complaints increased in the course of time, a committee of three judges usually undertakes preliminary examination before the complaint is admitted. 80 The applicant is also required to exhaust remedies in the lower courts before applying to the FCC. The new law in Ethiopia stipulates similar requirements. Not only is exhaustion of remedies in the relevant government institution required but the applicant is also required to have a final decision, that is an adjudication that has been exhausted and against which no appeal lies along the same path. These requirements, rigor ous as they might appear, try to sift out only the most relevant ones prevent ing the excessive flow of cases to the FCC or the HoF. It should not be for gotten that these bodies are established to adjudicate only constitutional is sues, distinct from the practice with decentralized forms of review.
Conclusion
As illustrated in the cases, the HoF has played an important role in the adjudication of constitutional matters particularly those cases that are of high political significance. The fact that the HoF is composed of representatives of nationalities indirectly elected by the electorate at regional level seems to give the HoF the profile of a political organ than a judicial one. Nevertheless this is not without possible implications as to its impartiality as Ethiopia is venturing into a multiparty politics. So far, there has been one ruling party at federal and state levels and the HoF's impartiality has not been brought to test. With the emerging multiparty politics, however, it remains to be seen how far the HoF will serve as an impartial adjudicator on important intergov ernmental conflicts.
